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Summary 
This paper investigates the relationship between the chosen quality strategy and the vertical 
co-ordination mechanism of a focal company by using new institutional economics, as well 
as strategic management approaches. The theoretical findings are tested using evidence 
from 19 of the largest Polish dairy cooperatives, surveyed in spring 2006. The results show 
that all co-ops recognise the changing market requirements and are treating food quality as 
more than plain food safety and the ability to continuously reproduce an ex ante defined set 
of attributes. However, compared to investor-owned dairies, co-ops are disadvantaged in 
quality-based competition due to their lower flexibility and access to financial and qualified 
human resources. To overcome this intense competition, co-ops modify their production 
profile, which leads to market segmentation. Moreover, the choice of quality strategy is an 
economic activity, guided by the co-op’s profit expectations within the selected market. 
The chosen quality strategy determines the design of the vertical co-ordination mechanism. 
Thus, the higher the requirements for the final product, the further quality management 
systems go beyond a firm’s boundaries, and the higher is the intensity of the relationships 
between the intermediary stages in the dairy chain. 
 
KEYWORDS: network theory, relationship management, quality management, 
cooperatives, Poland 
1. Introduction 
In countries where food is no longer scarce, questions of food security are becoming less 
important. Instead, issues addressing food safety and quality are gaining in importance. 
Thus, in most developed countries, food quality has been used as a means of differentiating 
food products (branded products versus non-branded products) whereas food safety has 
become a competitive necessity. However, due to food scares such as the BSE- and FMD- 
crises, or more recently, the “rotten meat” scandal in Germany, food safety issues 
connected with firm boundaries that overlap vertical interactions hold differentiating 
potential. Hanf/Hanf (2005) considered the most striking consequence of these dramatic 
food scares the fact that politicians, consumers, producers and suppliers all assess food 
quality as no longer the matter of a single firm. Instead, the whole food chain has to work 
together in order to deliver the “new quality”. Since food-borne hazards know no 
geographical boundaries, food safety standards have become a ubiquitous phenomenon that 
nationally and globally influences agri-food markets. Additionally, as products become 
more differentiated, commodity requirements are becoming more demanding, which leads 
to higher and more specific quality demands. Thus, in order to meet the demanded new 
quality, food processors and retailers have to re-design their food chains in such a way that 
these standards are adhered to every step of the way; thus, the co-ordination mechanism of 
the existing food chain must be altered. Spot market transactions, which are unable to 
properly co-ordinate the exchange of trust attributes, are substituted by transactions in 
vertically co-ordinated chain organisations. Such higher co-ordinated chain organisations 
are either hybrids or vertically integrated firms. For the agri-food business, there is   494
evidence that the majority of these chain systems is organised as vertical networks, i.e., 
supply chain networks (SCN). 
In transition countries or new member states, quality management concepts might still be 
an emerging field and might be used as a differentiating instrument: Through EU-
accession, the structure of those markets has shifted towards more globalisation and 
competition based on quality and price differences, rather than just price. On the one hand, 
the minimum quality standards of the EU set a bottom line that forces low-quality 
producers to raise their quality or drop out of the market. On the other hand, private 
standards such as the “International Food Standard” (IFS), and Standards of the “British 
Retail Consortium” (BRC), as well as industry-wide standardisation systems like the family 
of ISO standards are diffusing to those markets from Western countries. Concurrently, the 
new EU member states are seeing changing consumer demand – in terms of incomes and 
concerns over product standards. The changing environment in those markets, including 
both mandatory and voluntary standards, and ongoing restructuring processes at all stages 
in the food chain, may cause unique developments as far as quality management is 
concerned. 
The aim of this paper is to identify the quality perception of the Polish operators in the 
dairy market and to find out which influence the chosen quality strategy exerts on the 
vertical co-ordination mechanism. In the first part of the paper, we present a brief review of 
the relevant theories. Since the Polish dairy market is dominated by co-operatives, we 
additionally review the general co-operative literature. The literature suggest that due to 
their complex governance structures co-ops may face significant hold-ups affecting quality 
control and management. Following the theoretical discussion, the second portion of the 
paper details the relevance of quality management thoughts for the Polish dairy 
cooperatives. 
2. Theoretical  considerations 
What does the ‘new quality’ mean? 
There were several severe food crises in the years prior to the BSE- and FMD- crises in the 
winter of 2000/01, e.g. the Coke-scandal in Belgium, the BSE-crisis in the UK, and the 
wine-scandal in Austria and Germany. However, the crisis in the winter of 2000/01 can be 
regarded as the straw that broke the camel’s back (Hanf/Hanf 2005). The growing concerns 
of consumers, producers and governments worldwide have influenced the political debate 
on food safety. In the European Union (EU) a variety of new standards have been set in 
order to ensure the demanded minimum level of food quality. The result of these 
developments is that legal quality requirements are becoming more stringent and 
comprehensive (i.e., covering more safety attributes), and food policy is becoming 
increasingly integrated across various sectors (Ugland /Veggeland, 2006). 
With increasing knowledge and perception of risk, consumer demand for safety and a 
willingness to pay for it increases (Antle, 2001). At the same time, as incomes rise, 
consumers demand even more quality, including, besides safety, such attributes as 
nutritional value, product diversity and tightness of product specification. Providing 
credence attributes is becoming an integral and ubiquitous issue for business operators. 
Indeed, trust-based attributes are expanding and include, besides food safety and nutritional 
properties, different contextual product properties related to certain public goods or values, 
such as environmental justice or cultural (traditional) values, etc. (Allaire, 2004). Consumer 
are, however, not able or willing to intensively and fully ascertain the credence 
characteristics of food products. Thus, they look for signals to facilitate their buying 
decisions, e.g. a well-known brand or a certificate of quality, thereby motivating the 
participants of the food chain to take the appropriate measures and to meet the ‘new 
quality’ demand (Hanf/Pieniadz, 2006).   495
Through the expansion and deepening integration of the EU, the quality-based competition 
among business operators has intensified. On the one hand, the minimum quality standards 
of the EU force low-quality producers to raise their quality or drop out of the market 
(Hockmann/Pieniadz, 2006). On the other hand, the increasing demand for quality signals 
especially allows supermarkets and manufacturers of branded products to benefit from 
imposing voluntary, private quality and safety standards, some of which are even more 
stringent than similar governmental regulations. Hence, the use of private voluntary 
standards across food categories has been increasing in both long-standing EU members, as 
well as in transition countries (Swinnen, 2006; Spencer/Reardon, 2005). Fulponi (2006) 
argues that private standards will become even more prominent in upcoming years as we 
observe increased market concentration and buying power in the retail sector, as well as its 
integration with financial markets. Unnevehr et al. (1999) assert that since food safety and 
quality can be successfully managed using private standards, their diffusion will henceforth 
even reduce the need for direct legal regulations. Thus, in order to meet the demanded new 
quality, food processors and retailers will have to enact additional mechanisms and re-
design their food chains to induce the incentive-compatible behaviour of upstream business 
operators. Hanf/Hanf (2005) concluded that these demands on quality lead to the 
conceptualisation of chain quality management concepts by combining these ‘new quality’ 
demands with general chain management concepts. 
Verticalisation and chain quality management 
Food supply chains can be characterised as pyramidal-hierarchical networks. Such 
networks have a strategic character, with the focal company being the core element. The 
focal company is the centralised decision-making unit and may be either the manufacturer 
or retailer (Jarillo 1988). Thus, the focal company determines the decisions of all network 
members, including the choice of measures to ensure the achievement of the super-ordinate 
network aims (Wildemann 1997). Efficiency gains, higher profits, and cost reductions are 
important reasons for building such networks – which can be called supply chain networks 
– with food quality being regarded as one of the most important. Allaire (2004) mentioned 
the “quality turn” as a main reason for the tendencies towards verticalisation in food chains 
worldwide. The consultancy KPMG (2000) characterises verticalisation as the building of 
vertically coordinated systems resulting in changing markets for ‘fast moving consumer 
goods’ (FMCG). Thus, vertically coordinated systems are understood as the exchange of 
goods not primary conducted by market transactions. In other words, verticalisation means 
intensifying vertical relationships, which can take different forms of bilateral commitment 
between partnering firms based on implicit and explicit contracts. Generally, we can 
distinguish between two partnering types: strategic and operational partnering: 
Strategic partnering is defined as an “on-going, long-term, inter-firm relationship for 
achieving strategic goals, which deliver value to customers and profitability to partners” 
(Mentzer et al., 2000, p.550). The aim of strategic partnering is to improve or entirely alter 
a company’s competitive position through developing new products and technologies and 
by creating new markets (Webster 1992). Additionally, strategic partnering should also 
include exclusivity and non-imitability (Mentzer et al., 2000). Operational partnering is 
defined as a “needed, short-term relationship for obtaining parity with competitors” (ibid. 
p.550). Thus, an operational partnering strategy seeks to improve operational efficiency and 
effectiveness, especially by reducing transaction costs. Such orientation involves shorter 
time spans and less organisational resources. Therefore, operational partnership is much 
easier to implement (and also to reverse) than strategic partnership. In addition to such 
aspects of aligning interests, chain management has to consider aspects of coordination 
(Gulati et al., 2005). In their framework on chain management Hanf/Dautzenberg (2006) 
combined these considerations with the thought that networks consist of different levels,   496
namely firm, dyadic, and network levels. They point out that these three aspects have to be 
mirrored in the collective strategy
1 of a supply chain network. 
Thus, if quality is the leading idea or strategy to be coordinated along the SCN, all 
members must share a homogeneous understanding of quality management, which provides 
the preconditions for the emergence of a collective strategy, and thus collective actions that 
address the chosen strategy. In this case, we expect a correlation between the chosen quality 
strategy and the design of the partnership. Therefore, the following assumption can be made 
in order to test it empirically in the second part of the study: 
If a firm chooses a pure cost leadership strategy, we expect that this firm will produce 
products that solely meet the minimum quality requirements (EU/ governmental 
regulations). In this case, we expect that vertical exchange will take place by arm’s-length 
transactions, meaning that vertical co-ordination is more or less done via the (spot) market. 
Thus, it will be sufficient for a cost-optimising firm to develop operational partnerships in 
both upstream and downstream stages. If a firm chooses the opposite strategy of product 
differentiation and quality attributes (especially trust elements) are chosen as the means of 
differentiation, we expect the firm to develop more sophisticated relationships. Yet we 
expect that the differentiated firms are more likely to develop strategic partnerships. In this 
case, vertical co-ordination can be regarded as highly cooperative or even vertically 
integrated. 
Quality problems in co-operatives 
In the previous section we argued that food quality is no longer the matter of a single firm, 
but instead the whole food chain has to work together in order to deliver the ‘new quality’. 
However, Hanf/Schweickert (2003) as well as Hanf/Kühl (2005) mention that due to their 
organisational form, co-operatives face problems integrating themselves in supply chain 
networks. A major reason for this are the co-op’s internal institutions governing the 
behavior of the co-op’s members and affecting the co-op’s ability to manage the quality of 
its products. Arguments for this are the following: In the context of increasing vertically co-
ordinated agri-food systems, Sykuta/Cook (2001) showed that at the producer level, the 
most practical co-ordination mechanism is contracting. Because of their very own property 
rights structure, producer co-ops have some advantage compared to investor-owned firms. 
However, in addition to these benefits, they also face some problems. By using a property 
rights approach, Cook (1995) pointed out five general sets of problems: Free Riding 
Problems, Horizon Problems, Portfolio Problems, Control Problems and Influence Cost 
Problems. As Cook (1995) showed, these sets of problems constrict the various types of co-
operatives (Sapiro I-Nourse II) differently. Combining a principal-agent approach with the 
concepts of opportunistic behaviour, conflicts of interest, asymmetric information and 
stochastic conditions, Eilers/Hanf (1999) show that it is not clear who is the principal and 
who is the agent, i.e., both the co-operatives and the members can be principals and agents. 
For this reason, neither leadership mechanisms nor selective terms of delivery can be 
enforced by the co-operatives, i.e., the members can deliver all the commodities which 
alternative dealers do not accept. Co-operatives that are to accept these commodities face 
the problem of adverse selection. Additionally, Fulton/Giannakas (2001) show that the 
cross-subsidisation and member heterogeneity in large centralised, multipurpose co-ops 
may lead to substantial financial pressures for the co-operative because members of such 
co-operatives do not see a strong connection between the success of the co-op and their 
own business. Furthermore, Karantininis/Zago (2001) showed, by applying a game theory 
model, that instead of selling their commodities to open co-ops, farmers would rather sell 
                                                           
1 In general, collective strategies are defined as systematic approaches by collaborating 
organisations that are jointly developed and implemented (Astley/Fombrun 1983, Astley 
1984, Bresser 1988, Bresser/Harl 1986, Carney 1987, Edström et al., 1984, Sjurts 2000).   497
them to investor-owned firms if they had the choice. Fulton (1995) concludes that if 
markets disappear as a result of an increased vertical co-ordination, co-operatives may also 
begin to disappear. Hendrikse/Bijman (2002) share this assessment if investment on the 
side of the processor or retailer becomes more important for the total chain value than the 
investments by the farmers. In an empirical survey, Schramm et al. (2006) evaluated 
German dairy co-ops’ brands. Using institutional economic and behaviour approaches, they 
showed the strengths and weaknesses of co-ops’ branding strategies. Even though they 
were able to locate different factors exerting influence on branding strategies, quality issues 
were of major importance – negatively as well as positively. Besides these disadvantages, 
Briscoe/Ward (2006) name some managerial advantages of co-ops, as far as small and 
medium-sized co-ops are considered; These include better communications with farmers, 
staff flexibility, easier (more efficient) control, hands-on management, greater motivation, 
and identification. 
3.  Quality management in Polish co-ops 
Even though unbranded and branded products co-exist in the Polish dairy product market, 
an increase in market share of branded (higher quality) products is becoming evident. 
However, the majority of the branded products are produced by large companies. 
Particularly in the retailer sector, large (foreign-owned) retail chains are gaining market 
share. For these chains, it is typical to proliferate the food assortments, meaning that their 
suppliers are forced to produce more differentiated products. For the producing sector in 
Poland, it can be said that a consolidation is taking place; however, over 300 dairies still 
exist. The majority of these dairies are producer co-operatives with milk processing being 
their prime economic activity. Because of this, we have chosen co-ops as the unit of 
empirical investigation. 
We surveyed 19 of the 22 largest Polish dairy cooperatives in February and March 2006. 
Roughly equal numbers of semi-structured interviews were conducted across the various 
hierarchical levels in the co-ops, including chief executive officers, quality managers, and 
supervisors in the marketing and supply departments. The sequence of the questioned 
representatives was the same for each co-op. The interviews were conducted by telephone 
and lasted between 20 and 40 minutes per respondent.
2 This technique made particular 
sense in view of the above-mentioned research questions: On the one hand, chain quality 
management as well as networks concern activities and processes that are challenging to 
quantify and may even be ambiguous or misunderstood. On the other hand, the topics are 
particularly sensitive in emerging markets. Moreover, in those markets there might be some 
unique and relevant developments which have to be first recognised, while giving the 
respondents some freedom to explore our general views. In the following, we elaborate on 
the relevance of the previously considered quality management thoughts based on the 
surveyed cooperatives. 
General comments on dairy co-ops 
Despite the fact that organisational capabilities in Polish agriculture remain relatively low, 
producers’ cooperatives continue to be a significant part of Polish dairy processing. To 
some degree all cooperatives draw on the long history of cooperative thinking. Most of 
them were grounded in the 1920s and 1960s. According to the statements of the 
interviewed persons, cooperative values are coming increasingly under pressure. The 
challenges of maintaining a coherent socio-economic environment have been amplified by 
                                                           
2 Additionally, some major investor-owned dairies were interviewed as well. In this case, 
only the quality managers were asked for their analytic expertise, allowing relative 
statements regarding various quality management issues in co-ops and investor-owned 
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ongoing liberalisation, globalisation and standardisation, all of which change trade patterns 
for agricultural and food commodities and influence production costs and commodity 
prices. Similarly, the continuing expansion and deepening integration of the European 
Union, as well as the current reforms of the common market organisation for milk and milk 
products are redefining the challenges for operators in the European dairy market. Thus, for 
milk processors that decide to stay in the market, the issue is whether or not to adapt the 
current business strategy to the changing operating environment. The success of an 
enterprise not only depends on its ability to reconfigure the production system (technology, 
management) within the firm and improve the quality of inputs, but also to redesign its food 
chains, so as to efficiently produce the demanded quality and variety of milk products. In 
this context, co-ops face additional organisational problems that hamper their flexibility to 
make the needed adjustments. The complexity rises since the co-ops must meet the interest 
of their members while also satisfying the consumer. The member-driven orientation makes 
co-ops fundamentally different from investor-owned corporations in that they are 
compelled to look for quite stable markets, since they are not able to compete with more 
flexible and strictly profit-oriented private enterprises. 
The interviews showed that on the one hand, all co-ops recognise the changing market 
requirements (demanded new quality) and understand quality to be an important action 
parameter for reaching the needs and wants of the consumers. This indicates that even for 
the Polish co-ops, food quality is more than plain food safety and the ability to continuously 
reproduce an ex ante defined set of attributes. On the other hand, the co-ops are also aware 
of the strong competition on the product (consumer) market and of being confronted by 
multiple problems with regard to their ‘inherent characteristics’. One of the largest 
constrains seems to be the conflict between the co-ops’ status (co-operative principles) and 
economic goals: For most of the investigated co-ops, ‘success’ means the degree to which 
the enterprise has achieved the targeted goals. Since co-ops target different social and 
economic goals and the decisions are made mostly on a consensus-driven basis, there are 
plenty of potential conflicts of interest and hold-ups in the decision-making process. For 
example, with regard to the quality issue, there are significant inherent frictions when 
selecting small dairy producers–members that deliver low quality raw materials. The co-ops 
feel, generally, to be disadvantaged by the organisational and management structure, as 
well as by the limited financial and qualified human resources that would significantly 
improve both the process and product quality. Some co-ops also mentioned restricted 
access to foreign capital and know-how as being their main competitive disadvantage in 
quality improvement. Indeed, investor-owned firms with foreign investments benefit from 
having better access to approved business concepts and quality assurance systems, as well 
as capital from the main company. In interviews, the representatives of the two firms with 
FDI mentioned that they had not noticed any additional costs regarding implementation of 
higher quality standards in the plant. The implementation of QMS was monitored by 
representatives of the main company, and the staff in the domestic sub-company was well 
advised and supported by special training with regard to quality issues. One of the co-op 
leaders mentioned that “the domestic dairies with FDI have just to copy the approved 
business concept and educate their staff on the costs of the mother company, whereas the 
co-ops have to be very ‘innovative’ while meeting the current market challenges and 
dealing with co-op specific constrains”. The ‘innovative’ thinking refers, however, to 
finding a creative solution under the given circumstances, while imitating the marketing 
strategies of private and prospering companies. 
The above-mentioned considerations reveal that the lack of investment is one of the crucial 
hurdles for those investigated co-ops that wish to adopt additional quality improvement 
instruments. Surveyed co-op representatives reported being sceptical regarding the benefits 
of the quality assurance systems prior to their implementation. In some cases, these doubts 
had postponed the decision to adopt. Once introduced (i.e., HACCAP prior to EU 
accession) the co-ops acknowledged many advantages, i.e., less variation in quality outputs,   499
better harmonisation of operational sequences, and less variability of staff skills while 
managing the quality. 
Further, co-ops recognise some advantages as far as the relationship with their suppliers are 
considered: Producers tend to trust a cooperative more than (foreign) investor-owned 
companies . The surveyed representatives pointed out that a farmer is typically risk-averse 
and seeks stable, trust-based relationships and social acceptance, both of which he can 
enjoy as a member of a co-op. In most cases, these utilities outweigh pecuniary 
disadvantages, since most of the co-ops bid lower prices for raw milk. Additionally, their 
support as ‘service providers’ enables them to supply some services to the farmers 
independent of the government or other private services. Besides information transfers 
between the co-op and the farmers (consulting, choice of production techniques), co-ops 
offer their members credits or access to credits for investments in the growth and 
specialisation of the farms. These instruments increase producer loyalty and assure, at least, 
continuous access to raw materials. However, co-ops still face multiple conflicts when 
selecting quality suppliers (supplier=member). The organisational ‘stickiness’ in the 
selection process of quality producers impedes the manufacturing process and quality 
output and compels the co-ops to target markets for lower quality. Nevertheless, the co-ops 
strive to adjust to the market requirements and utilise various instruments to induce the 
incentive-compatible behaviour of upstream business operators. For example, co-ops use 
quality-dependent payment schemes to remunerate better raw milk quality. Additional 
provisions exist as well, including a price premium for extraordinary quality (super extra) 
and direct delivery for farms either approved by the veterinary bureau or which possess 
certain breeds of milk cows. All co-operatives pay a price premium on membership. Thus, 
payment schemes differ greatly between dairies. However, in all pricing mechanisms, the 
price increases as compliance with quality requirements set by the purchaser increases. Co-
op representatives mentioned that the EU quality regulations have an immense ‘educative’ 
influence on the farmers with regard to quality improvements. On the other side, mandatory 
regulations take away a co-op’s ability to select (passive selection). The co-ops expect 
some competitive advantages at the procurement stage due to the better ‘access’ to their 
local communities, in the middle-term. 
Proposition: Cooperatives are disadvantaged in quality-based competition due to their 
lower flexibility and limited access to financial and qualified human resources. Thus, they 
are often imitators or choose generally stable markets for their proliferation. 
Proposition: Cooperatives have some advantages over private firms at the procurement 
stage in the mid-term, owing to their local communities’ attachment, and their potential of 
being a ‘service provider’ that enables them to supply services independent of the 
government or other private services. 
The co-ops solution: How to be competitive 
First Level: Market segmentation 
Economies of scale have become a factor of considerable importance in the milk sector and 
have affected all stages and legal forms of enterprises in Europe. The (largest) Polish co-
ops recognise the challenge and strive to expand in the milk market by applying various 
growth strategies. The most common strategy is internal growth via entering new (export) 
markets and market penetration with regard to FMCG such as UHT-milk. Moreover, well 
performing co-ops expand through mergers and acquisitions which, besides rapidly 
increasing revenue, allow them to utilise economies of scope, e.g. the transfer of capital, 
technology and know-how within the company, as well as synergies of using common 
brand names. We observe that all investigated co-ops modify their production profile, 
which leads to a kind of market segmentation and mitigates direct rivalry among firms. 
Basically, they move toward specialisation on either the white or yellow production line, or   500
they extend their production, offering highly diversified goods of both lines. The interviews 
indicate that firms use both cost-leadership, and to different degrees, product differentiation 
strategies. Product differentiation is important to all investigated co-ops, as they recognise 
the need to make products more attractive to the target market. However, differentiation 
takes various forms, from a simple modification to an existing product (a new flavour of 
yoghurt) to creating a new branded product in which factors other than price are taken into 
account by consumers (market segmentation). 
Proposition: To overcome the intensive competition, co-ops modify their production 
profile, which leads to market segmentation. 
Second Level: Choice of quality strategy: 
The heterogeneity of the co-ops is even greater when comparing the chosen quality 
strategies. Co-ops which take the role of the focal firm in a dairy chain especially act to 
escape from price competition by setting themselves apart and bringing quality to a 
differentiating parameter. Investments in brand, reputation and reduction of information 
asymmetry about product quality (social marketing, TV spots, food exhibitions, etc.) are 
becoming a priority for this group. All of those co-ops use intensive ISO quality standards. 
Some of them also implemented voluntary ISO standards on environmental management 
and possess an adequate certificate integrating both systems, whereas the remaining 
manufacturers of branded products intend to implement them in the near future. The 
respondents of those co-ops stressed that the main incentive for implementing the voluntary 
environmental standards was to demonstrate their environmental concerns, and hence to 
increase their reputation and brand loyalty. Several dairies in those group additionally 
address region-specific credence attributes, such as cultural and traditional values of the 
area where the co-op is located, and social justice while stressing the importance of product 
purchase for employment in rural areas. In most cases this strategy leads to a kind of ‘local 
patriotism’ among consumers, as far as the purchase of the regional milk products is 
concerned. To stabilise their market shares and to protect their independence, the co-ops 
with a strong brand reject producing and selling their products under a private retailer’s 
label. This premium-quality strategy, however, usually concerns the largest of the 
investigated co-ops, and thus seems to be a minority when all Polish co-ops are considered. 
On the other ‘end’ of the investigated firms are co-ops that utilise a strong cost-orientation 
for their competitive advantage. Cost leadership is achieved by economies of scale, thus 
producing basic products and improving the efficiency of all business operations is a 
priority for this group. In those groups there are usually no dominant standard-setting 
purchaser, thus the dairies have some freedom in their choice of quality strategies and 
measures to guarantee the effectiveness of the chosen strategy. Accordingly, those co-ops 
offer their products at the cheapest price (price leadership) while meeting just the minimum 
quality as demanded by the obligatory regulations. The representatives of those co-ops 
argued that there is so far no need to change this strategy, since there is still a profound 
group of low income consumers who demand their products, and hence enable attractive 
profits. Because the firms do not posses a strong brand, they use voluntary public quality 
certifications and labels to signal quality, such as “Q” (quality) and “Eco” (ecological), 
developed and assigned by the Polish Centre for Testing and Certification (PCBC). Some 
standards promote national food products of high and reliable quality, such as the “Try Fine 
Food” standards (PDZ) designed by the Polish Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development. Representatives of the co-ops mentioned however, that they recognised that 
their products are currently threatened by the plurality of signs, which can sometimes even 
increase the uncertainty among consumers. 
Between those two above-mentioned groups there are co-ops that are strongly dependent on 
direct purchasers. Usually these co-ops have no brand (or not a strong one) and regard the 
dominant purchaser as the standard-setting entities; they then adjust their quality strategy 
and management to the respective requirements.   501
If the focal company is a manufacturer requiring tightly-specified industrial products, the 
co-op has to adjust quality assurance systems to the specific requirements (i.e., unique 
chemical or physical parameters). Quality signals and voluntary quality systems seem to be 
irrelevant to those co-ops. Some FDI use the possibility of intra-industry trade based on the 
co-ops’ supply, since the co-ops have better access to the local milk suppliers. On the other 
hand, the co-ops benefit from the financial support of the focal firm, while carrying out 
relation-specific investments. Joint investments first concerned quality improvements at the 
procurement stage, and then the adoption of new processing technologies. The adherence to 
specific requirements is ensured by close business-to-business (B2B) relations, including 
some knowledge-sharing routines and enhanced monitoring. Additionally, in such direct 
relationships, the threat of direct and strong sanctions (losing the focal purchaser) limits 
opportunistic behaviour and facilitates cooperative adaptation by the co-op. At the same 
time, the high intensity of unexpected controls and enhanced monitoring suggests that the 
focal firm either does not trust the partner or must steadily improve the knowledge about its 
capability, as well as the correctness of the process.  
If a dairy sells its products to a retail chain and the retailer then sells them as proprietary 
private label products, the implementation of retailer-specific schemes will be required. 
Thus, the processors are voluntarily obligated to implement standards for auditing retailer-
branded food products, such as IFS and BRC. Interestingly, the retailers are satisfied if 
those concepts are running but they do not need to be certified, which seems to be specific 
for an emerging market. In this case, the quality standards are used to coordinate pooled 
interdependencies. We found that focal firms prefer control-based relationships rather than 
trust-based ones to govern partnership behaviours and the maintenance of their specific 
requirements. In particular, retailers with strong bargaining power apply restrictive control 
mechanisms, even if the running quality concepts are certified. Adjustment to the retailer-
specific requirements involves investment in specialised resources, which increases the co-
ops’ dependence on retailers. However, because IFS and BRC are widely used standards, 
the co-ops have formal access to alternative institutional customers on the national or 
international markets. 
Proposition: Co-ops follow different quality strategies within the chosen production profile. 
Adoption of higher quality standards is an economic activity, guided by the co-op’s profit 
expectations. 
Third Level: Verticalisation: 
The chosen quality strategy influences the vertical coordination mechanism along the dairy 
chain. In the next step we investigate the linkages between quality performance and the 
design and intensity of vertical relationships with the upstream and downstream stages by 
examining four groups identified in our data set. The main findings illustrates Scheme 1. 
The scheme was developed by type of dairy cooperative based on the chosen quality 
strategy and the dominant purchaser. The dominant purchaser was, in most cases, the focal 
and hence standard-setting unit exercising chain quality management. Thus, even if a co-op 
delivers its products to different purchasers, the dominant one determines the co-op’s 
quality performance, and hence the design of the relationships with the upstream stages 
(suppliers). If a co-op is a manufacturer of branded products, it takes the position of a focal 
company itself. Producing and delivering quality products requires implementation of 
superior (or at least higher than average) quality management systems. However, we found 
some differences even between the quality producers. 
q Manufacturers of branded products have recognised that they must actively create their 
own distribution opportunities. For all channels – retail, wholesale, and export – they use 
medium- and long-term contracts which contain all sorts of details that address product 
quality matters. Thus, the co-ops control, to some extent, quality measurements that are 
external to the firm. However, despite reciprocal information exchange and ongoing 
negotiations, these relationships still have an operational character (↔). However, the co-  502
ops increasingly use partnering mechanisms that are more strategic in nature, so marketing 
information such as point-of-sale data is exchanged. The co-marketing is particularly 
intensive in partnerships with retail chains, because it is based on ongoing negotiations and 
adjustments addressing sales strategies, promotions, and pricing behaviour (↔). Typically, 
this leads to complex reciprocal interdependencies, which demand well-defined 
organisational principles and a certain level of management skills to govern the 
relationships. Such relation-specific systems seem to be unique for an individual chain of 
branded products manufacturer. 
Interaction at the procurement stage can also be described as intensive, especially with the 
larger and specialised farmers (↔). Using incentives to upgrade the quality of raw milk, the 
co-ops exert a firm boundary for the overlapping quality scheme. Some of the actions result 
from the implementation of ISO quality standards, which require quality objectives to be 
included in the quality policy and to be leveraged to upstream stages. Additionally, the co-
ops provide intensive consulting assistance and herd management for their members. One 
co-op even provided business angles as an alternative know-how source (technology 
transfer) as early as at the beginning of the 1990s. Overall, we think that in this case, we 
can speak not only from a chain quality concept; instead, it is a strategic one. 
o&p When the focal company is either a manufacturer or branded retailer, we found that 
purchasers prefer control-based relationships rather than trust-based ones to govern 
partnership behaviours and the maintenance of their specific requirements (→). In 
particular, retailers with strong bargaining power apply restrictive control mechanisms, 
even if the running quality concepts are certified. Adjustment to the retailer-specific 
requirements involves investment in specialised resources, which increases the co-ops’ 
dependence on the retailers. However, because IFS and BRC are widely-used standards, the 
co-ops have formal access to alternative institutional customers on the national or 
international markets. Contracts and managerial discretion are used to meet sequential 
interdependencies, with the contracts containing specifics on quality and payment. As long 
as these specifics are met, the duration is prolonged. Additionally, we found some 
reciprocal interdependencies among the partners in B2B relationships between the co-ops 
and the industrial purchaser. Overall, the relationships between the focal companies and the 
dairies is very intense. Therefore, this type of partnering is more strategic than operational. 
Regarding the relationship between co-ops and their members, we found that co-ops 
encourage growth strategies through intensive consulting assistance, which aims to select 
larger farms (→), hence, they use economies of scale. Overall, we conclude that supply 
chain networks are established and chain quality management is exercised. However, even 
though the partnering can be described as more strategic in nature, there is a lack of a 
collective quality strategy. Thus, we would classify the paradigm as an operational chain 
quality management. Because more and more retailers are bringing their proprietary private 
label products on the market, there is increasing price competition among the products. For 
the concerned co-ops, this means that they face strong pressure on the costs, which 
precludes resource allocation to more sophisticated quality management systems. 
n Because of the strong cost orientation of the basic product producers, it is not surprising 
that those processors apply mandatory standards and schemes and restrict their 
relationships with suppliers to the basic commitments and principals as regulated in the 
cooperatives’ statute (→). Nevertheless, the co-ops’ relationships seem to be better 
developed at the procurement stage than at the distribution stage. We could identify 
operational partnerships between the co-ops and their milk suppliers and some dyadic 
actions addressing the chosen quality strategy at this stage, but there is still a missing 
recognition of similar interests and initiatives to explore operational advantages in 
relationships with their institutional customers. Further development of retailers and 
wholesalers with strong bargaining power will force the dairies either to join their SCN or 
take the role of a focal company and strengthen their brand. Independent of that, the dairy 
must first create its supply chain network and develop a chain quality management.   503
Proposition: The challenge of the focal firm is to choose the quality approach that best fits 
the overall network’s aims as well as its performance. 
Proposition: The chosen quality strategy determines the design of the vertical co-ordination 
mechanism. The higher the requirements of the final product, the further quality 
management systems go beyond a firm’s boundaries and the higher is the intensity of the 
relationships between the intermediary stages in the dairy chain. 
4. Final  remarks 
Food today is perceived as a complex bundle of characteristics, with an increasing level of 
importance placed on credence attributes relating to product and methods of production 
(e.g. environmental friendliness). Food processors and retailers must re-design their food 
chains in such a way that all stages of the food chain are involved to meet the demanded 
‘new quality’. Therefore, the coordination mechanism of the existing food chain has to be 
altered, because spot market transactions are unable to properly coordinate the exchange of 
credence attributes; they must be substituted by transactions in vertically coordinated chain 
organisations. Such chain organisations are either hybrids or vertically integrated firms. For 
the agro-food business, there is evidence that the majority of these chain systems are 
organised as vertical networks i.e., supply chain networks. Chain management must 
incorporate the relationships and interdependencies of the member firms, as well as 
problems arising at the firm level, the dyadic level, and the network level. Applying these 
thoughts on quality issues, it becomes evident that we have to differentiate between 
operative chain quality management and strategic chain quality management. 
The example of Polish dairy co-operatives provides new insights into quality management 
issues faced by cooperatives. First, our findings indicate that activities related to quality 
improvements are generally aligned with current market opportunities for optimal 
enterprise performance. On the one hand, co-ops recognise that they must deliver safe and 
reliable food and differentiate their products, at least in a partial way, to make them more 
attractive to the consumer. This indicates that even for the co-ops, food quality is more than 
plain food safety and the ability to continuously reproduce an ex ante defined set of 
attributes. On the other hand, co-ops face various problems, the largest of them being the 
conflict between the co-ops’ principles and economic goals and limited financial and 
qualified human resources that would significantly improve both process and product 
quality. The co-ops’ specific problems compel them to modify their production profile and 
usually to tap markets for basic products, since they are hardly able to compete with more 
flexible and strictly profit-oriented private enterprises on markets for high-value added 
products. However, our study reveals that there are some exceptions to this general 
observation, especially when examining the co-ops’ chosen quality strategy and the design 
of the quality management systems. 
Overall, we conclude that in most cases, supply chain networks are established and chain 
quality management is exercised. However, this is only the case if there is a focal actor that 
influences its network structure. The results show that retail chains and industrial 
purchasers with foreign investment and strong bargaining power usually take the position 
of the focal firm in the SCN. In those cases, strategic partnering between the individual 
chain stages dominates. However, because there is a lack of a collective quality strategy 
overlapping all actors, quality management initiatives are still operational in this case. 
There are still some Polish co-operative dairies that are not embedded in any SCN. These 
concern processors of non-branded goods or those with weak brands that sell their products 
to purchasers without a focal position. Because there is no powerful focal firm in the chain, 
no managerial discretion can be exerted and no chain quality management concepts can be 
installed. Thus, we could only identify operational partnerships between the co-ops and 
their milk suppliers and some dyadic actions addressing the chosen quality strategy at the 
procurement stage. In contrast, at the distribution stage we observed that the partners do not   504
share homogenous interests regarding quality issues; there is even a lack of dyadic 
initiatives aimed at exploring the operational advantages of the cooperation. 
Our empirical results show profound diversity regarding quality management approaches in 
the Polish milk supply chains. However, one thing is clear: The chosen quality strategy 
determines the design of the vertical coordination mechanism. Thus, the higher the product 
requirements, the further quality management systems go beyond a firm’s boundaries and 
the stronger is the shift from operational towards strategic quality management. 
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Scheme 1: Typology of Polish dairy chains: Linkages between the chosen quality 
strategy and the design of the relationships between a cooperative and 
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